Mercer Law Review
Volume 28
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 15

12-1976

State and Local Taxation
L.O. Buckland
Gary B. Andrews

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Taxation-State and Local Commons

Recommended Citation
Buckland, L.O. and Andrews, Gary B. (1976) "State and Local Taxation," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 28 : No. 1
, Article 15.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol28/iss1/15

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

State and Local Taxation
By L. 0. Buckland* and Gary B. Andrews**

This survey covers the cases decided over the past two years, since the
state and local tax section was omitted in the last annual survey. The
principal activity during this period concerned ad valorem taxation, but
the nature of many of these cases permits them to be noted in summary
fashion. If this and previous surveys are any indication, the concern of
property owners over rising ad valorem taxes is more likely to be aired in
court than their concern over any other form of taxation.
As in previous surveys, this review divides the cases into the major tax
areas for discussion. A section on remedies has been added because the
cases are applicable to several types of taxes.
I.

AD VALOREM TAXES

A.

Assessment

Expression of taxpayer dissatisfaction in court has reached unusual proportions in this state during the past few years. Most common were class
actions seeking equitable relief with respect to the manner, means, and
results of local valuation determinations and the state revenue commissioner's involvement therein.' The most significant developments in ad
valorem taxation during the survey period signal at least a change of direction for this type litigation if not an end to it.
In Tax Assessors of Gordon County v. Chitwood,2 five individuals and
the "Gordon County Citizens for Fair Taxation" brought a class action
against various county officials and the state revenue commissioner seeking to void the tax digest and enjoin increased valuations and tax collections thereon. In support of the relief sought, the taxpayers alleged certain
infirmities in the methods and results of property valuations. The trial
court granted the relief sought, and the supreme court reversed. In reversing, the court held that the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law
* Partner in Goodman, Whitmer, Buckland & Andrews, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory University (J.D., 1970). Member of the Georgia Bar.
** Partner in Goodman, Whitmer, Buckland & Andrews, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (J.D., 1971). Member of the Georgia Bar.
1. For example, see the cases of Herring v. Ferrell found at 234 Ga. 620, 216 S.E.2d 862
(1975); 233 Ga. 1, 209 S.E.2d 599 (1974); 137 Ga. App. 156, 223 S.E.2d 213 (1976); 133 Ga.
App. 445, 211 S.E.2d 366 (1974); 130 Ga. App. 431, 203 S.E.2d 617 (1973).
2. 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759 (1975).
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through the county board of tax equalization,3 and equity jurisdiction was
thus lacking.
The ruling in Chitwood was subsequently followed, and perhaps expanded,' in Chilivis v. Backus,5 Chilivis v. Kell,' and Butts County v.
Briscoe.7 This trilogy makes it clear that judicial review of the state revenue commissioner's actions in equalizing the various county tax digests
may be initiated only by the county, and not by individual taxpayers.'
Although Chitwood, Backus, Kell and Briscoe all turned on the issue of
jurisdiction, the court also made various other rulings of interest in the
area of ad valorem taxation. In these decisions the Georgia Supreme Court
held: defective notices of changed assessments may be corrected by the
county without affecting the validity of the assessment;9 the statutory
definition of "fair market value" is not too vague and indefinite to be
enforced;' 0 "actual use," as opposed to "highest and best use," is a factor
to be considered in determining fair market value, but is not the exclusive
factor;" utilization of different methods in arriving at fair market value2
does not violate the uniformity provision of the Georgia Constitution;1
and, there is no lack of uniformity in the laws pertaining to individual
taxpayers who return their property to the county, and railroads and pub3
lic utilities who make their returns to the state revenue commissioner.'
For those taxpayers who chose to pursue their differences with the
county tax officials through the board of equalization, the results were
mixed. In Peaglerv. Georgetown Associates" and Tift v. Tift County Board
of Tax Assessors," the taxpayers failed to timely perfect their appeals, and
the court held that neither implied nor expressed extensions of time for
filing notices of appeal are authorized. Where procedural hurdles were
overcome, the taxpayers had uniform success in the court of appeals in
cases where reversals of jury verdicts were sought on appeal to the superior
court from the board of equalization. These cases, Murray v. Richardson,"
Aldon Industries,Inc. v. Gordon County Board of Tax Assessors,'7 Hodson
3. See GA. CODE ANN. §92-6912 (1974).
4. An examination of the allegations made in these cases leads to the conclusion that it
would be a rare grievance which would not be addressable by the board of equalization.
5. 236 Ga. 88, 222 S.E.2d 371 (1976).
6. 236 Ga. 226, 223 S.E.2d 117 (1976).
7. 236 Ga. 233, 223 S.E.2d 199 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Chilivis v. Kell, 236 Ga. 226, 229, 223 S.E.2d 117, 120 (1976).
9. Chilivis v. Backus, 236 Ga. 88, 90, 222 S.E.2d 371, 374 (1976).
10. Id.
ii. Id.
12. Id.
13. Chilivis v. Kell, 236 Ga. 226, 228, 223 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1976).
14. 232 Ga. 848, 209 S.E.2d 186 (1974).
15. 234 Ga. 155, 215 S.E.2d 3 (1975).
16. 134 Ga. App. 676, 215 S.E.2d 715 (1975).
17. 136 Ga. App. 598, 222 S.E.2d 42 (1975), cert. granted.
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v. Duckett,"' and Board of Tax Assessors, Richmond County v. Gardner,9
should be closely reviewed by any attorney involved in this type litigation.
It should be noted that in Boyton v. Lenox Square, Inc.,20 the court held
that arbitration is still available in Fulton County and that a board of
equalization is not required to be established in that county. In light of this
decision, the applicability of Chitwood to actions arising in Fulton County
is unsettled at this time.
B.

Exemptions

The practice of encouraging industrial development through the grant
of tax exemptions is not uncommon in our taxation laws.2' One such plan,
however, was struck down as unconstitutional in Wasden v. Rusco Industries, Inc.22 The court found a 1925 statutez unconstitutional where it
authorized a five year ad valorem tax exemption to certain industries upon
referendum approval." The effect of Wasden upon local development efforts is speculative at this time.
Two other cases relating to exemptions from ad valorem taxation were
decided during the survey period. The first, Leggett v. Macon Baptist
Ass'n,25 held that the administrative office of the Macon Baptist Association was not used primarily as a place of religious worship within the
meaning of the constitutional and statutory exemptions"6 of such property.
In Adams v. Dawn Memorial Park," the county tax commissioner sought
to recover back taxes on property which had received a cemetery exemption 8 for a number of years but had been sold for commercial purposes.
The supreme court held that the summary-judgment evidence required a
finding that the land had been held in good faith2 9 for cemetery purposes.
C.

Miscellany

The statute authorizing the state revenue commissioner to adjust county
valuations also requires that a proportionate adjustment of millage rate
18. 135 Ga. App. 922, 219 S.E.2d 634 (1975).
19. 135 Ga. App. 939, 219 S.E.2d 609 (1975).
20. 232 Ga. 456, 207 S.E.2d 446 (1974).
21. For example, new and expanded manufacturing industries receive certain sales and
use tax benefits. GA. CODE ANN. §92-3403aC(2)(n)(1974).
22. 233 Ga. 439, 211 S.E.2d 733 (1975).
23. GA. CODE ANN. §92-206 (1974).
24. The court reasoned that since the exception was not enumerated in GA. CONST. art.
VII, §1,
4, GA. CODE ANN. §2-5404 (1973), the statute was unauthorized.
25. 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974).
26. GA. CONST. art. VII, §1, 4, GA. CODE ANN. §2-5404 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. §92-201
(1973).
27. 234 Ga. 105, 214 S.E.2d 542 (1975).
28. GA. CONST. art. VII, §1,
4, GA. CODE ANN. §2-5403 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. §92-201
(1974).
29. Suttles v. Hill Crest Cemetery, Inc., 87 Ga. App. 343, 73 S.E.2d 760 (1952).
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occur such that "the adjusted county digest will produce an amount of
revenue reasonably equivalent to that amount of revenue which would
have been produced had no adjustment been made to the county
valuations. ' '31 Since the millage rate is required to be submitted to the
state revenue commissioner along with the digest,3 ' many county school
32
systems found themselves setting a rate at the constitutional maximum
and actually collecting on a somewhat lower rate. In Board of Commissioners of Newton County v. Allgood,33 the court held that the board of education is entitled to set its millage rate based upon the digest finally approved by the state revenue commissioner.
In broad perspective, probably the most important case decided in the
area of ad valorem taxation during the survey period was Wages v. Michelin Tire Corp.," which ultimately made new law in the U. S. Supreme
Court. 35 However, an adequate discussion of the holding and implications
of Michelin is not within the scope of this article.
II.

SALES TAX

Construction and application of exemptions continued to be the most
active area of sales tax litigation during the survey period. Three such
cases were decided by the appellate courts. Each resulted in a denial of
the exemption sought, and all three presented rather narrow issues for
decision.
In Blackmon v. Screven County IndustrialDevelopment Authority,36 the
taxpayer sought an exemption for climate-control equipment used in its
textile manufacturing plant on the basis that such equipment was "used
directly" in its process within the meaning of the statute. 7 Again rejecting
an "essentiality" test,3 the court held that the equipment was taxable. In
a case which is probably of more interest to lexicographers than attorneys,
the supreme court held in Blackmon v. Dixon" that tobacco drying units
were not used in "harvesting" so as to qualify for the exemption sought. 0
30. GA. CODE ANN. §92-7001(c) (1974).
31. GA. CODE ANN. §92-7002.1 (1974).
32. GA. CONST. art. VIII, §12, 1; GA. CODE ANN. §2-7501 (1973).
33. 234 Ga. 9, 214 S.E.2d 522 (1975).
34. 233 Ga. 712, 214 S.E.2d 349 (1975).
35. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 535 (1976).
36. 131 Ga. App. 265, 205 S.E.2d 497 (1974).
37. GA. CODE ANN. §92-3403aC(2)(n) (1974) exempts, inter alia: "The sale of machinery
which is used directly in the manufacture of tangible personal property when such machinery
is incorporated for the first time into a new manufacturing plant located in this State."
38. See Hawes v. Custom Canners, 121 Ga. App. 203, 173 S.E.2d 400 (1970).
39. 234 Ga. 703, 217 S.E.2d 283 (1975), rev'g 134 Ga. App. 184, 213 S.E.2d 513 (1975).
40. GA. CODE ANN. §92-3403aC(2)(v) (1974) exempts, inter alia: "The sale, to persons
engaged primarily in producing farm crops for sale, . . . equipment used exclusively in
harvesting such crops."
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In Gainesville-HallCounty Economic Opportunity Organization,Inc. v.
Blackmon,4 the court held that a statutory exemption for private elementary and secondary schools42 does not apply to a private eleemosynary
corporation which, with certain minor exceptions, services different age
groups and offers programs different from those of the public schools. Of
more general interest is the holding in this case that the proof of payment
of sales tax by a purchaser to a seller relieves the purchaser from any
further responsibility. The statute is quite ambiguous on this point.43
Richs, Inc. v. Blackmon" foreclosed the use of what could have been a
very effective sales and use tax avoidance device. A prior case, Colonial
Pipeline Co. v. Undercofer,5 had suggested that an otherwise non-taxable
item, specifically transportation charges, could be removed from the sales
and use tax base by the parties to the transaction if they contracted for it
separately from the taxable item, tangible personal property. Rather than
follow the dictum of Undercofler, however, the court in Rich's adopted a
"moment of purchase" test from Florida" "whereby freight charges incurred before the consummation of the transaction were included within
the cost price of the property and freight charges incurred after the consummation of the sale were excluded from the cost price of the property."4'
Presumably this test will be applied to other items which are similar to
freight charges.
5
The taxpayer in CarlingBrewing Co. v. Blackmon"
was a manufacturer
and wholesaler of malt beverages who also supplied point of sale advertising materials to its retail dealers. The state revenue commissioner had
assessed the taxpayer for its purchase and use of the advertising materials,
and the assessment was opposed on the ground that the materials were
purchased for resale to the retail dealers. The court of appeals held for the
commissioner for two reasons. First, the nature of the transfer between the
taxpayer and the retailer was not a sale within the meaning of the act.
Second, even if the transfer were to be considered a sale, it was not a sale
for resale and it occurred in Georgia.
It should finally be noted that the constitutionality of the successor
liability statute49 was upheld in Richards v. Blackmon. 0 In Richards, the
court also held that compliance with the bulk transfer laws does not relieve
a taxpayer from compliance with the sales tax statute.
41. 233 Ga. 507, 212 S.E.2d 341 (1975).
42. GA. CODE ANN. §§92-3403aC(2)(m),(u) (1974).
43. GA. CODE ANN. §92-3402a(e) (1974).
44. 133 Ga. App. 665, 211 S.E.2d 916 (1975).
45. 115 Ga. App. 58, 153 S.E.2d 592 (1967).
46. See United States Gypsum Co. v. Green, 110 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1959), and Whitehead
& Kales Co. v. Green, 113 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1959).
47. 133 Ga. App. 665, 669, 211 S.E.2d 916 (1975).
48. 131 Ga. App. 211, 205 S.E.2d 492 (1974).
49. GA. CODE ANN. §92-3422a (1974).
50. 233 Ga. 739, 213 S.E.2d 638 (1975).
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INCOME TAXES

The similarity of the state and the federal income tax laws substantially
removes most of the areas of income tax conflict between taxpayers and
the state.' The state, however, has jurisdictional limitations on its power
to tax that are not faced by the federal government. These jurisdictional
limitations are inherent in most state income tax questions. For example,
these limitations require the income of a taxpayer doing business both in
Georgia and in other states to be apportioned among Georgia and the other
states. As a result, the primary areas of conflict revolve around apportionment of the income-whether the income should be apportioned, and how
it is to be apportioned.
In 1967, the Georgia Court of Appeals set forth the rule that the same
standards used to determine whether a foreign corporation was doing business in Georgia were to be used to determine whether a domestic corporation was doing business outside Georgia.52 If, under these standards, the
domestic corporation was deemed to have been doing business outside
Georgia, it could apportion its income for tax purposes. This rule was
applicable even if the corporation did not pay any tax in the other state.
The Georgia Supreme Court extended this line of reasoning through its
holding in Blackmon v. Habersham Mills, Inc. 3 Significantly, in reaching
its decision, the supreme court rejected Oxford v. Tom Huston Peanut
Co. 4 and specifically disapproved of the language in Oxford which stated:
"If the plaintiff [taxpayer] is not doing business in other States so as to
be subject to their jurisdiction for taxing purposes, it is not entitled to
apportion its income in Georgia.""5
Habersham Mills substantially increased the possibilities for domestic
corporations to apportion income out of Georgia. Prior to the Habersham
Mills decision, it had been necessary to establish that the domestic corporation was at least subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the other state under
the Georgia jurisdictional standards. If a corporation desired to minimize
its state income taxes, sufficient contacts had to be maintained in the
other states which would make the corporation subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the other states under the Georgia standards, but at the same
time those contacts had to be maintained at a level low enough to permit
the protection of 15 U.S.C.A. §§381-8458 to come into play. The supreme
51. For example, the holding in Chilivis v. Studebaker Worthington, Inc., 137 Ga. App.
337, 223 S.E.2d 747 (1976), governing pre-1969 net operating loss carryovers, is of limited
value because the deduction of such losses now follows the provisions of federal law. If they
are deductible under federal law, they are deductible under Georgia law.
52. Hawes v. William L. Bonnell Co., 116 Ga. App. 184, 156 S.E.2d 536 (1967).
53. 233 Ga. 501, 212 S.E.2d 337 (1975), aff'g 131 Ga. App. 59, 205 S.E.2d 21 (1974).
54. 102 Ga. App. 714, 118 S.E.2d 204 (1960).
55. 102 Ga. App. at 727, 118 S.E.2d at 212.
56. 15 U.S.C.A. §§381-84 (1976). Pub. L. 86-272 essentially provides that a state cannot
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court, however, held that even this was unnecessary and stated: "Whether
a corporation is subject to the taxing jurisdiction of other states, as we read
our statute on this subject, is immaterial.." 57 The only criterion for apportionment indicated by the court is that the taxpayer be engaged in interstate business. It thus appears that a domestic corporation can apportion
its income if its only contact is to make sales in another state. Establishing
contacts other than mere sales with the other state would be risking taxation by the other state.
The court also addressed the question of apportionment in Blackmon v.
Henry C. Beck Co."5 where it held that if a non-manufacturing corporation
derived income both from within and from without the State of Georgia,
then apportionment was mandatory even though the income derived from
the business done in Georgia could be determined from the taxpayers
records. In arriving at its conclusion, the court overruled the decision in
Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. Head. 9 Under Mexican Petroleum, if a corporation derived income from two or more states, but the business giving rise
to the income derived in Georgia was separate from the business conducted
in other states, then the Georgia income could not be apportioned. In Beck,
however, the court rejected the separate business approach and looked only
to see if the corporation had income both from within and from without
the State of Georgia. The geographical source of income rather than the
nature of the business which gave rise to the income is thus the determining factor6 0 This concentration on the geographical source of income, if
adhered to strictly, raises the distinct possibility that the court would, for
example, hold that apportionment of all income was required by a taxpayer that operated a warehousing business in California and a rug cleaning business in Georgia, even though the income derived from both businesses could be definitely established. The taxpayer would have income
arising from doing business in two states, and the decision in Beck indicates that this fact alone is sufficient to require apportionment. Under the
proper circumstances, a substantial amount of income could be apportioned to Georgia even though it had not been generated by business conducted in Georgia.
Whether this new interpretation by the supreme court meets the due
process requirements of the federal and state constitutions has not been
decided. In the absence of a binding decision and with no desire to litigate
impose an income tax on a corporation selling tangible personal property if its only contacts
with the state amount to solicitation only.
57. 233 Ga. 501, 503, 212 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1975).
58. 233 Ga. 412, 211 S.E.2d 711 (1975), affg 131 Ga. App. 634, 206 S.E.2d 842 (1974).
59. 64 Ga. App. 529, 13 S.E.2d 887 (1941).
60. GA. CODE ANN. §92-3102 (Supp. 1976) provides that a corporation will pay an income
tax on its Georgia taxable income, which is defined as "taxable income from property owned
or from business done in Georgia" (emphasis added). The business income is determined by
referring to the allocation and approtionment provisions of GA. CODE ANN. §92-3113 (1974).
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the constitutional issues, the safest course of action is to petition the state
revenue commissioner to permit the filing of returns on a separate business
basis. Theoretically, such filing would more clearly represent the amount
of income arising from business conducted in Georgia."
In a case which involved the granting of permission by the state revenue
commissioner, the Georgia Supreme Court held that once permission was
granted to a taxpayer to file returns in a certain manner, the permission
could not thereafter be revoked by the commissioner for any of the years
in which the taxpayer had filed a return. Additionally, the court held that
the prohibition against revocation covered the year in which the commissioner had made the revocation decision, even though the return for that
year had not been filed so long as the taxpayer had relied on the permission
and organized its business accordingly. 2 The court stated: "The attempt
to revoke these written permissions retroactively after the lapse of such an
extended period of time, during which the taxpayer was allowed to conduct
its business in reliance thereon, creates an inequity under the circum''
stances of this case. 63
If permission can be obtained from the state revenue commissioner to
file returns in some particular manner, it appears that a taxpayer does not
have to be concerned about the effects of a subsequent audit as long as it
can be established that the business was conducted in reliance upon the
permission. Two such areas in which the legislature has granted the state
revenue commissioner discretionary powers are: (1) the filing of consolidated returns by affiliated corporations when the corporations are not all
doing business solely within Georgia;" and (2) the use of a taxpayer proposed method of apportionment to more clearly reflect the amount of
income arising from doing business in Georgia." Since the court based its
decision on the equity of the situation, the possibility is raised that the
revenue commissioner can be estopped from revoking the permission if the
taxpayer can establish that its method of conducting business, adopted in
reliance on the permission, could not be changed without substantial
harm. The extent of the court's equitable approach in Gable can better be
appreciated by understanding that the court found Georgia's pre-1969 law
regarding the filing of consolidated returns followed the federal law, despite the inherent jurisdictional limitations existing in state taxation, the
61. GA. CODE ANN. §92-3114 (1974) permits a taxpayer to apply for permission to file
returns based upon books of account which clearly reflect the amount of income attributable
to the trade or business conducted within the state. GA. CODE ANN. §92-3115 (1974) permits
a taxpayer to apply for permission to use a formula for apportionment different from the one
set forth in GA. CODE ANN. §92-3113 (1974).
62. Gable Industries, Inc. v. Blackmon, 233 Ga. 542, 212 S.E.2d 328 (1975), rev'g Blackmon v. Gable Industries, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 354, 208 S.E.2d 101 (1974).
63. 233 Ga. at 544, 212 S.E.2d at 330.
64. GA. CODE ANN. §92-3102 (Supp. 1976).
65. See note 61, supra.
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absence of substantive state law or regulation governing the filing of consolidated returns, and the lack of mention of consolidated returns in Georgia law.
Filing of state income tax returns is facilitated by the state's following
federal tax law. It is, however, necessary to report any subsequent federal
adjustments to the state revenue commissioner." If the taxpayer fails to
report the federal adjustments to the state revenue commissioner, the
commissioner can make an assessment from any available information
within five years after receiving notice from the federal government that a
federal adjustment was made. This procedure was discovered by a taxpayer in Blackmon v. Monroe, 7 when the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of the statute and required the taxpayer to pay an assessment
of additional state income taxes. This assessment was based upon information received from the Internal Revenue Service. A taxpayer should thus
be aware of the state-income-tax implications whenever there is a controversy between the taxpayer and the federal taxing authorities, since they
will, in all likelihood, be the same as the federal tax implications in this
area.
IV.

MISCELLANEOus TAXES

In Brumby v. Brooks,6" the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute imposing liability on a person required to file unemployment compensation tax returns 9 but held that a new trial on the
personal liability of a corporate officer was necessary because of a misleading charge to the jury. Since there are few reported Georgia cases dealing
with the personal liability of a corporate officer or employee for corporate
taxes, this case is of particular interest. It is illustrative of the scope of
Georgia's personal-liability statutes. The evidence established that the
appellant had financial control over a number of different corporations,
one of which went out of business without paying unemployment compensation taxes to the Georgia Department of Labor. In discussing the enumerations of error, the court stated that it was proper to focus the jury's
attention on the appellant's control over the corporation's finances rather
than on the appellant's proprietary interests.
Another action against an individual was decided in favor of the taxpayer in Wanthal v. City of Atlanta. 0 The court of appeals held that a
partner in an accounting firm was not required to obtain a business license
for management consulting services when the partners of the firm individ66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

GA. CODE ANN. §92-3303(f) (Supp. 1976).
233 Ga. 656, 212 S.E.2d 827 (1975).
234 Ga. 376, 216 S.E.2d 288 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN. §54-650.2 (1974).
134 Ga. App. 419, 214 S.E.2d 694 (1975).
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ually paid an occupation tax and management consulting was one of the
services rendered by public accountants under the rules and regulations
promulgated under the state licensing laws. The trial court had also decided that licensed professionals were not required to obtain a city business
license, but this point was not cross-appealed. However, strict liability was
imposed in Scott v. Blackmon.71 A motor-fuel distributor failed to collect
motor fuel taxes and the evidence established that a purchaser was a
potential highway-user of the fuel.
In 1974, the supreme court declared the first uniform beer tax act unconsitutional. 71 Subsequently, the legislature enacted another uniform beer
7
tax statute.7 3 Upholding its constitutionality in Chanin v. Bibb County,
the supreme court held that the infirmities of the first statute were no
longer present. However, a local ordinance, instituted during the period
between the time the first statute was declared unconstitutional and the
enactment of the second statute, was struck down because the county did
not have the power to impose an excise tax. Other constitutional attacks
against the statute, not resolved in Chanin, were rejected by the court in
7
State v. Golia. 1
V.

REMEDIES

During the survey period, there were four appellate decisions relating to
various remedies 71 available to taxpayers seeking judicial review of their
state tax liabilities. Two of the cases rejected arguments that conditioning
access to the courts upon payment of the liability asserted, or posting a
bond, is violative of procedural due process requirements.7 The other two
cases involved amendments to the taxpayers' initial pleadings.
In Ingalls Iron Works Co. v. Blackmon," the court of appeals held that
an appeal from an assessment could not be amended so as to add a claim
for refund. Amendment of an affidavit of illegality was, however, allowed
in Dalton Carpet Industries, Inc. v. Chilivis.7 The amendment was to
correct what the court characterized as an "obvious typographical error."' 0
Formerly, payments of county and municipal taxes and license fees were
not recoverable even though erroneously or illegally assessed and col71. 132 Ga. App. 578, 208 S.E.2d 589 (1974).
72. Blackmon v. Golia, 231 Ga. 381, 202 S.E.2d 186 (1973).
73. GA. CODE ANN. §58-706.1 (Supp. 1976).
74. 234 GA. 282, 216 S.E.2d 250 (1975).
75. 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976).
76. See, Buckland, State Taxpayer Remedies, 27 Mer. L. Rev. 309 (1975).
77. Lee v. Chilivis, 234 Ga. 255, 216 S.E.2d 109 (1975); Gainesville-Hall County Econ.
Opportunity Organization, Inc. v. Blackmon, 233 Ga. 507, 212 S.E.2d 341 (1975).
78. 133 Ga. App. 164, 210 S.E.2d 164 (1974).
79. 137 Ga. App. 266, 223 S.E.2d 460 (1976).
80. 137 Ga. App. at 267, 223 S.E.2d at 461.
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lected.8 ' This harsh rule was changed by legislation in 1975,2 and payments
made after July 1, 1975,3 can be recovered pursuant to statutory grounds
and procedures.
81. See, e.g., Blackmon v. Ewing, 231 Ga. 239, 201 S.E.2d 138 (1973).
82. GA. CODE ANN. ch. 92-39A (Supp. 1976).
83. In Town of Lyerly v. Short, 234 Ga. 877, 218 S.E.2d 588 (1975), the court held that
the statute cannot be given retrospective application.

